missouri v jenkins case brief 1990

On October 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals denied the petitions with an order stating as follows: "There are now three petitions for rehearing en banc pending before the Court. U.S. 167, 169 LOCATION:Kansas City Missouri School District DOCKET NO. 365 As a segregation remedial order, a federal court ordered Missouri (Defendant) to fund raises for teachers and staff in the Kansas City Metropolitan School District and to fund magnet programs. [495 (1881) (distinguishing Meriwether, supra). [495 The method of taxation endorsed by today's dicta suffers the same flaw, for a district court order that overrides the citizens' state-law protection against taxation without referendum approval can in no sense provide representational due process. Opinion Announcement - April 18, 1990, Board of Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall. The court then directed KCMSD to "approve a property tax levy rate for 1989 at a later date when financial calculations for the 1989-1990 school year are clear and submit the proposed levy rate to the Court for approval at that time." 402 The State urges us to hold that the tax increase violated Article III, the Tenth Amendment, and principles of federal/state comity. See n. 13, supra. 855 F.2d 1295, (1915). 406 U.S. 33, 42] The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. U.S. 33, 80] The District Court should have made more findings to determine whether the KCMSDs student population was a result of vestiges of past discrimination. This final iteration of the Missouri v. Jenkins cases (this case is deemedMissouri v. Jenkins III) marks the end of the Courts involvement in the 18-year-long litigation. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Missouri_v._Jenkins&oldid=1063285610, United States Supreme Court cases of the Rehnquist Court, United States school desegregation case law, Short description is different from Wikidata, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License 3.0. appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. . In 1985, a federal district court issued a remedial order, requiring the state of Missouri to create a plan to bring magnet schools to the Kansas City Metropolitan School District and to improve the school facilities within the district. The court issued an order detailing a desegregation remedy and the financing necessary to implement it. (1906) (where state municipality enters into a bond obligation based on delegated state power to collect a tax, State may not by subsequent abolition of the municipality remove the taxing power; such an act is itself invalid as a violation of the Contracts Clause); Wolff v. New Orleans, This case has been before the same United States District Judge since 1977. 55a (correcting order for assessment of penalties for nonpayment that "mistakenly" assessed penalties on an extra tax year); id., at 57a ("clarify[ing]" the inclusion of savings and loan institutions, estates, trusts, and beneficiaries in the court's income tax surcharge and enforcement procedures). Accepting the District Court's conclusion that state-law limitations prevented KCMSD from raising sufficient funds, it held that those limitations must fall to the Constitution's command and affirmed all of the District Court's actions taken to that point. U.S. 33, 55]. It is instead one that brings the weight of federal authority upon a local government and a State. Ibid. `the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems' should be entitled to respect." The purpose of the position was to "solicit community support and involvement" in the District Court's desegregation plan. an area of a country or city, esp. A federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury. [495 In 1985, US District Court Judge Russell Clark ordered the legal remedy of educational improvement programs, school facility repairs, and magnet schools, which were thought to be the best way to attract white suburban students back into city schools. nor the record support this view. Though the matter is not without difficulty, we conclude that the State has the better of the argument. Missouri v. Jenkins. Rule App. U.S. 33, 78]. In Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 57, 110 S.Ct. [495 41 ("nothing in the record to suggest" that tax limitation was intended to frustrate desegregation) with Griffin, supra, at 221 (State Constitution amended as part of state and school district plan to resist desegregation). 433 Missouri v. Jenkins is one piece of the complex puzzle of litigation involving the desegregation of the . [495 had resigned their office no one remained on whom the mandamus could operate). [495 U.S. 33, 82]. 788 S.W.2d 536 (1990) Robert D. JENKINS, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. The District Court therefore abused its discretion in imposing the tax itself. However, concluding that federal/state comity principles required the District Court to use minimally obtrusive methods to remedy constitutional violations, it required that in the future the lower court should not set the property tax rate itself but should authorize KCMSD to submit a levy to state tax collection authorities and should enjoin the operation of state tax laws hindering KCMSD from adequately funding the remedy. for Cert. The remedy must therefore be related to the condition alleged to offend the Constitution. 22(a); Mo. The State has argued here that the District Court, having found the State and KCMSD jointly and severally liable, should have allowed any monetary obligations that KCMSD The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Bd., supra, at 233, had established the District Court's authority to order county officials to levy taxes. Star Athletica, L.L.C. See id., at 1299 ("[W]e modify [the order's] future operation to more closely comport with limitations upon our judicial authority"); id., at 1318 ("We . The Court of Appeals of course cannot make the record what it is not. of Estimate v. Morris, 1983 that the Kansas City Missouri School District managed a segregated public institution. (1977), we upheld a prospective remedial plan, not a "money judgment," ante, at 54, against a State's claim that principles of federalism had been ignored in the plan's implementation. [495 120a-124a. Cf. See, e.g., Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Bd., 377 U. S. 218, 377 U. S. 233. often used to encourage voluntary movement of students within the district in a pattern that aids desegregation. Proceedings before the District Court continued during the appeal. v. Rodriguez, As part of its remedial order, for example, the District Court ordered the hiring of a "public information specialist," at a cost of $30,000. In 1987, the district courts ordered mandatory salary assistance, arguing that to end segregation in the schools the district needed higher-paid, quality teachers. See Mo. San Antonio Independent School Dist. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/515/70/case.html, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2967250?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, San Antonio Indep. U.S. 248 App. [495 Missouri v. Jenkins provides a good starting point for examin-ing the role of the judiciary in sculpting, implementing, and moni-toring a remedial plan for desegregation. mandat[ed] a particular method or structure of state or local financing." When it was subsequently brought to the Eighth Circuit's attention that it had neglected to refer to those papers in its order as petitions for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing in banc, the court amended its order nunc pro tunc to ensure that the order reflected the reality of the action taken on October 14. X, U.S. 33, 34] Few ends are more important than enforcing the guarantee of equal educational opportunity for our Nation's children. The Court of Appeals reasoned that permitting the school board to set the levy itself would minimize disruption of state laws and processes and would ensure maximum consideration of the views of state and local officials. 705 (1867); Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. App. Unlike legislative bodies, which may hold hearings on how best to raise revenues, all subject to the views of constituents to whom the Legislature is accountable, the Judiciary must grope ahead with only the assistance of the parties, or perhaps random amici curiae. U.S. 33, 56] 1961) (A. Hamilton). Finding that construction of new schools would result in more "attractive" facilities than renovation of existing ones, the District Court approved new construction at a cost ranging from $61.80 per square foot to $95.70 per square foot as distinct from renovation at $45 per square foot. 400, 408 (WD Mo. But it is discrimination, not the ineptitude of educators or the indifference of the public, that is the evil to be remedied. There is technically no provision for the filing of a "Petition for Rehearing En Banc" in the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id., at 103a. As the District Court acknowledged, the plaintiffs and the KCMSD pursued a "friendly adversary" relationship. Id., at 266. [495 [495 The State's role with respect to the quality education programs has been limited to the funding, not the implementation, of those programs and many of the goals of the quality education plan already have been attained. As the Eighth Circuit judges dissenting from denial of rehearing in banc put it: "The remedies ordered go far beyond anything previously seen in a school desegregation case. U.S. 218 Id., at 411. 1, of the Constitution, under which a State may not pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. U.S. 33, 40] A remedy that uses the quality of education as a lure to attract nonminority students will place the District Court at the center of controversies over educational philosophy that by tradition are left to this Nation's communities. 443 U.S. 531, 541 128 U.S. 212, 215 Indeed, it may be that a mere 12-acre petting farm, or other corresponding reductions in court-ordered spending, might satisfy constitutional requirements, while preserving scarce public funds for legislative allocation to other public needs, such as paving streets, feeding the poor, building prisons, or housing the homeless. Footnote 2 Respondents did not cross-petition to challenge this aspect of the Court of Appeals' judgment, so the surcharge is not before us. Footnote 16 : distr.) Although a District Court necessarily has discretion to fashion a remedy for a school district unconstitutionally segregated in law, such remedial power is not unlimited and may not be extended to purposes beyond the elimination of racial discrimination in public schools. U.S. 43, 45 -55 (1973). 491 U. S. 284-289. 239 The Court asserts that its understanding of Griffin follows from cases in which the Court upheld the use of mandamus to compel local officials to collect taxes that were authorized under state law in order to meet bond obligations. The suggestion that failure to approve judicial taxation here would leave constitutional rights unvindicated rests on a presumption that the District Court's remedy is the only possible cure for the constitutional violations it found. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995), is a case decided by the United States Supreme Court. Copyright 2023, Thomson Reuters. 855 F.2d, at 1314. Where a tax is imposed by a governmental body other than denied, 19 (W.D.Mo. Rehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Souter, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, This page was last edited on 2 January 2022, at 04:55. It comes as no surprise that the cost of this approach to the remedy far exceeded KCMSD's budget, or for that matter, its authority to tax. United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Citation 491 US 274 (1989) Argued Feb 21, 1989 Decided Jun 19, 1989 Advocates Bruce Farmer Assistant Attorney General of Missouri, argued the cause for the petitioners Jay Topkis argued the cause for the respondents Facts of the case 535 (1867); Board of Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 24 How. However, the date of retrieval is often important. (1990), is missing here. ] The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that such an injunction would violate the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. A federal courts power to remediate school segregation is bounded by the nature and scope of the initial constitutional violation. [495 Proc. The State funded all of those measures by court order. (1979) (whether a state agency "may be ordered actually to promulgate regulations having effect as a matter of state law may well be doubtful"). The State's argument that the funding ordered by the District Court violates the principles of equity and comity because the remedial order itself was excessive aims at the scope of the remedy, rather than the manner in which the remedy is to be funded, and thus falls outside this Court's limited grant of certiorari. -547 (1972)). District courts can and must take needed steps to eliminate racial discrimination and ensure the operation of unitary school systems. 433 Ante, at 52-53, n. 18. 503. U.S. 141, 145 Missouri V Jenkins Case Brief Case Name: Missouri v. Jenkins Case Citation: 491 U.S. 274 (1989) Supreme Court of The United States FACTS: An appeal to the Supreme Court for a case against a defendant promoting racial segregation within a school district in Missouri. U.S. 33, 65] The District Court ordered an extensive capital improvement program to rehabilitate the deteriorating physical plant of KCMSD, the cost of which was estimated as at least $37 million, of which $27 million was to be contributed by the State. . Title 28 U.S.C. U.S. 187, 196 The practice does not extend to petitions for rehearing seeking only to correct a formal defect in the judgment or opinion of the lower court. Id., at 70a. This Court, with full justification, has given latitude to the district judges that must deal with persisting problems of desegregation. Supp., at 53-55. 27. This type of order raises a substantial question whether a district court may extract taxes from citizens who have no right of representation and then use the funds for expression with which the citizens may disagree. A reasonable attorney's fee under 1988 is one calculated on the basis of rates and practices prevailing in the relevant market and one that grants the successful civil rights plaintiff a "fully compensatory fee," comparable to what "is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client." Some of these improvements involved basic repairs to deteriorating facilities within the school system. 376 (1861) (state statute gave tax officials authority to levy the tax needed to satisfy a bond obligation and explicitly required them to do so; mandamus was proper to compel performance of this "plain duty" under state law). U.S. 33, 43], Although the Court of Appeals thus "affirm[ed] the actions that the [District] [C]ourt has taken to this point," id., at 1314, it agreed with the State that principles of federal/state comity required the District Court to use "minimally obtrusive methods to remedy constitutional violations." this case, the State styled its filing as a "Petition for Rehearing En Banc." The application was returned as untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. The District Court believed that it had the power to order a tax increase to ensure adequate funding of the desegregation plan, but it hesitated to take this step. The court rejected various proposals by the State to make "capital improvements necessary to eliminate health and safety hazards and to provide a good learning environment," because these proposals failed to "consider the criteria of suburban comparability." 122a. (1977), the District Court found this insufficient. WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Part II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III, and IV, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. As long as the state is not interfering on the basis of race, the courts should step aside. We find it unnecessary to reach the difficult constitutional issues, for we agree with the State that the tax increase contravened the principles of comity that must govern the exercise of the District Court's equitable discretion in this area. one regarded as a distinct unit because of a particular characteristic, The attempt to end the practice of separating children of different races into distinct public schools. Footnote * Its end purpose is not only to remedy the violation to the extent practicable, but also to restore control to state and local authorities. 53a. A. There is no allegation here, nor could there be, that the neutral tax limitations imposed by the people of Missouri are unconstitutional. Consequently, Rule 35(c) specifically provides that the filing of a suggestion for It is the end of civil society. Finally, the State argues that an order to increase taxes cannot be sustained under the judicial power of Article III. address. 433 Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995), is a case decided by the United States Supreme Court. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR and SCALIA, JJ., joined, post. Did the District Court exceed its constitutional authority by ordering salary increases of instructional and non-instructional employees of the KCMSD? Synopsis of Rule of Law. 16 App., p. 491, and the Eighth Circuit may have believed, because of the label on the State's papers, that the State intended its filing to be read as containing both. 493 (1964). [495 The suggestion that our limited grant of certiorari requires us to decide this case blinkered as to the actual remedy underlying it, ante, at 53, is ill founded. 18 But we did not there state that a district court could never set aside state laws preventing local governments from raising funds sufficient to satisfy their constitutional obligations just because those funds could also be obtained from the States. Furthermore, parties frequently combine a petition for rehearing and a suggestion for rehearing in banc in one document incorrectly labeled as a "petition for rehearing in banc," see Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. 855 F.2d, at 1318-1319. The Eighth Circuit ordered the District Court to divide the cost equally between the State and KCMSD. . 210 103 [495 U.S. 33, 44] The case before us represents the first in which a lower federal court has in fact upheld taxation to fund a remedial decree. was explained in Pink, "[a] timely petition for rehearing . [ U.S. 124, 161 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in this case twice earlier. papers as only a suggestion for rehearing in banc, without a petition for panel rehearing as well, Rules 35(c) and 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure would have required the court to issue its mandate within 21 days of the entry of the panel's judgment. To hold otherwise would fail to take account of the obligations of local governments, under the Supremacy Clause, to fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes on them. See 672 F. To the contrary, 1983 is authority enough to require each tortfeasor to pay its share of the cost of a remedy if it can, and apportionment of the cost is part of the District Court's equitable powers. U.S. 33, 53]. MARSHALL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. The Court held that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the tax increase, which contravened the principles of comity. Although that court believed that it had no alternative to imposing the tax itself, it, in. 1 406 74 MISSOURI v. JENKINS Opinion of the Court I A general overview of this litigation is necessary for proper resolution of the issues upon which we granted cer-tiorari. Mo. 1986) (en banc), cert. Get free summaries of new US Supreme Court opinions delivered to your inbox! The focus of their concern is Missouri v. Jenkins,' a 1990 United States Supreme Court decision. The Court's discussion today, and its stated approval of the "method for future funding" found "preferable" by the Court of Appeals, is unnecessary for the decision in this case. Oral Argument - October 30, 1989; Opinion Announcement - April 18, 1990 . This analysis can be done by looking at state action and not social science. The State of Missouri and Kansas City students had been involved in an 18-year-long. See 855 F.2d, at 1318 (Lay, C. J., concurring and dissenting); Brief for Icelean Clark et al. . Appeals "did not require the District Court to reverse the tax increase that it had imposed for prior fiscal years," it "required the District Court to use the less obtrusive procedures beginning with the fiscal year commencing after the remand." (1984); United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (in banc), cert. Footnote 21 855 F.2d, at 1318. On September 16, the State filed with the court a document styled "State Appellants' Petition for Rehearing En Banc." True, today's case is not an instance of one branch of the Federal Government invading the province of another. The following are excerpts from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Jenkins. 138-142. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. (1974) (per curiam); Shenker v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 282 Footnote 14 O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England. TermsPrivacyDisclaimerCookiesDo Not Sell My Information, Begin typing to search, use arrow keys to navigate, use enter to select, Stay up-to-date with FindLaw's newsletter for legal professionals. In movant's brief . The State's filing on its face did not exactly comport with any of these options. As the Court describes it, the local KCMSD possesses plenary taxing powers, which allow it to impose any tax it chooses if not "hinder[ed]" by the Missouri Constitution and state statutes. Instead, predominately black schools may instill pride in black students and their communities, allowing them to be as successful as nonminority students. . . 433 The Court of Appeals observed that the increases were designed to eliminate the vestiges of state-imposed segregation by improving the "desegregative attractiveness" of the district and by reversing "white flight" to the suburbs. 291 (1987). Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750 (1978), cert. The email address cannot be subscribed. Brief for Respondents at 7, Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990) (No. . The State was then ordered to increase the property taxes to pay for costs of desegregating KCMSD. The ultimate inquiry is whether the constitutional violator has complied in good faith with the decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable. The District Court took no action to reverse its tax increase through fiscal year 1988-1989. It adopted in substance a KCMSD proposal that every high school, every middle school, and half of the elementary schools in KCMSD become magnet schools by the 1991-1992 school year. BRIEF HISTORY, FACTS, AND HOLDING OF JENKINS. We accept, without approving or disapproving, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court's remedy was proper. coupons then due. Absent a change in state law, the tax is imposed by federal authority under a federal decree. The Court states that the KCMSD was "invested with authority to collect and disburse the property tax." Cf. Sch. De facto segregation does not violate the constitution, de jure segregation does. This case involves an 18-year long litigation regarding school segregation in the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD). Many of the goals of the quality education programs have been attained, and there is an interest in having the court hand back over control to the State and local authorities. The District Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the court order for the State to fund those measures. Whatever the merits of this argument when applied to the District Court's own order increasing taxes, a point we have not reached, see supra, at 53, a court order directing a local government body to levy its own taxes is plainly a judicial act within the power of a federal court. On January 10, 1989, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals issued an amended order, recalling the October 14 mandate and entering nunc pro tunc, effective October 14, an order denying the three "petitions for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing en banc." [495 1961). We have no authority to extend the period for filing except as Congress permits. (Rehnquist, C.J.) Lastly, the order requiring the State to continue to fund the quality education programs also cannot be sustained. 855 F.2d, at 1315. Get free summaries of new US Supreme Court opinions delivered to your inbox! The historical record of voluntary compliance with the decree of Brown v. Board of Education is not a proud chapter in our constitutional history, and the judges of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals have been courageous and skillful in implementing its mandate. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U. S. 274, 276 (1989) (Jenkins I). . We have approved desegregation orders using assignment changes and some ancillary education programs to ensure the operation of a unitary school system for the district's children. It determined that segregation had caused a systemwide reduction in student achievement in the city district's schools and ordered a wide range of remedial "quality education" programs for all students in the city district's schools. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. . First, does the Eleventh Amendment prohibit enhancement of a fee award against a State to . H. Bartow Farr III argued the cause for petitioners. Const., Art. its own taxes. I am required in light of our limited grant of certiorari to assume that the remedy chosen by the District Court was a permissible exercise of its remedial discretion. Rev. 8 The court also denied as premature a motion by KCMSD to approve a proposed property tax levy of $4.23 for fiscal year 1989-1990. JENKINS 495 U.S. 33 (1990) Jenkins produced a unanimous result but with two sharply differing opinions on an important question concerning the power of federal courts to remedy school desegregation. remand for further modifications as provided in this opinion"). Under Missouri law, the KCMSD has power to impose a limited property tax levy up to $1.25 per $100 of assessed value. The prudence we have required in other areas touching on federal court intrusion in local government, see, e. g., Spallone v. United States, In pursuing the demand of justice for racial equality, I fear that the Court today loses sight of other basic political liberties guaranteed by our constitutional system, liberties that can coexist with a proper exercise of judicial remedial powers adequate to correct constitutional violations. Proc. See 807 F.2d, at 684-685. Respondents argue that the original order is more probative of the Eighth Circuit's contemporaneous treatment of the State's petition, and they contend that order clearly does not treat the petition as requesting panel rehearing. I agree also that the District Court exceeded its authority by attempting to impose a tax.

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